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ASPIRATIONAL CONSTITUTIONALISM, SOCIAL RIGHTS PROLIXITY AND 
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: TRILOGY OR TRINITY? 
- Catarina Botelho 
 
ABSTRACT  
The epistemic community of constitutionalists and experts in public law is called to critically examine the main 
assumptions of fundamental social rights theory and its evident impact on the distribution of power among political 
actors. This article argues that the challenge of social rights’ enforceability is clearly exacerbated in austerity contexts 
and within the framework of strong judicial review models. 
One can question not only the legitimacy of downsizing legislation on social rights protection during economic setbacks, 
but also the constitutional courts’ authority to dispute this kind of reformatio in pejus. From this perspective, the 
author would analyze the interesting evolution of the Portuguese Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence of crisis. 
Given their extensive commitment to social rights, aspirational constitutions leave more room for institutional tensions 
between democratic deliberation/popular sovereignty and an over-extended judicial power. Therefore, a too ambitious or 
unrealistic constitutional text may seduce judges to colonize political and economic issues. Precisely for that reason, this 
paper focuses on Brazilian right-to-health litigation, hoping to contribute to a puzzling and highly controversial 
constitutional debate: whether the so-called “judicial activism” is an illegitimate juristocracy or just compliance with the 
constitutional text?  
 
ASPIRATIONAL CONSTITUTIONALISM  
The ideational pattern of “aspirational constitutionalism”, as the name suggests, is full of hope and 
aspirations. The text requires being an active instrument of political and social change. In order to 
fulfill this ambition, boldness should insinuate itself into the constitutional design.  The 
constitutional reality is often idealized and the text focuses not on what the constitution is but on 
what it can be.1 As examples we can point out many constitutional texts that emerged from 
authoritarian or totalitarian regimes such as the Portuguese, the Spanish, the Colombian or the 
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Brazilian Constitution. These examples share a very heavy political history and the ambition of 
getting over the struggles of the past and building a fairer future. 
A. What is the relevant time: the past, the present or the future?  
Constitution makers answer the question “what is the relevant time: the past, the present or the 
future?” differently, that is why there are diverse conceptions of constitutionalism. From an external 
or sociological perspective on Constitutional Law, the doctrine tends to distinguish two main 
conceptions of constitutionalism: (i) functional or protective constitutionalism; and (ii) aspirational 
constitutionalism.2 Still, there can be a myriad of possibilities in between, more or less equidistant. 
Thus, it is clear that most of the constitutional texts do not fall solely into one category.3 For this 
reason, the distinction should not be exacerbated and it is suitable for a propaedeutic perspective of 
constitutionalism4. Both constitutional conceptions share a sense of common purpose and complex 
balance intent between the normal inconstancy of law and the need for stability and consistency 
endogenous to the constitutional norms.5 
 
The functionalist approach goes back to the constitutional movement at the end of the 18th century. 
The liberal constitutions which resulted from the French and American Revolutions consecrated the 
rule of law, separation of powers and a catalog of essentially negative rights.6 Nowadays we can trace 
this kind of constitutional perspective in the United States, Canada, Austria, Germany, Belgium, 
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Denmark or Ireland. The constitutional catalogues are frugal and minimalistic as the constitutional 
text only prescribes what can be achieved. Therefore, the text concentrates itself on the present 
moment, on what it wants to preserve in the present time and hopefully sustain in the future. In 
order to do so, constitutional norms tend to be politically neutral or aseptic.  
On the other hand, in an aspirational constitutionalism scenario, the constitutional text is prolix, 
long and exhaustive, contemplating a wide range of rights and usually a generous catalog of social 
constitutional rights, even beyond the budgetary possibilities of the State.7 We can identify a certain 
dose of constitutional pretentiousness in the way the text is worded, with too ambitious or 
unrealistic superlatives. This constitutional arsenal is sometimes difficult to interpret and to 
implement. Therefore, questions arise with regard to the dilution of borders between judicial and 
legislative power.  
After gathering the basic traits of each constitutional conception, what we question is whether 
intermediate alternatives are more balanced or not? The dangers of an extremely aspirational 
constitution are plain to see. First, there is a distressing lack of connection between the 
constitutional text and constitutional reality. This disconnection is potentially disturbing for the 
constitutional project of a State, as it threatens its probity and suitability.8 Instead of a normative 
constitution, in which the constitutional text accompanies the constitutional reality, aspirational 
constitutionalism is often based on semantic constitutions.9 
In a semantic constitution, the constituent power tries to portray the historical and political moment 
of its elaboration.10 As a metaphor, we can think of the constituent power taking a picture of a 
concrete reality and trying very hard to perpetuate this reality through the times that will come. That, 
however, is not very likely to succeed. The problem is that, at first, it may seem that people are 
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happy and involved with the constitutional design. However, in both, intra-generational and 
intergenerational perspective, the political and sociological sensibilities of one time are not 
necessarily bequeathed to the following decades. As time goes by, it becomes increasingly difficult 
not to see this one-sided constitutionalism as a helpless political cover-up that downplays the fact 
that a Constitution is not a governmental programme. When a constitution is not politically neutral 
and functionalizes its fundamental rights ideologically, it risks of being overcome by the democratic 
volatility.  
B. Semantic constitutions or the need to perpetuate a constitutional moment  
The Portuguese example is pertinent to provide an illustration of this kind of phenomena. After 
almost five decades of the right-wing authoritarian regime of Salazar (“Estado Novo”), there was a 
military coup called “Revolução dos Cravos” led by the Movement of Armed Forces (MFA). However, 
the overthrow of Salazar’s dictatorship did not mean the immediate advent of democracy.11 
In fact, there was a significant intellectual confrontation between the “revolutionary path”, which 
defended a dominant and authoritarian constitution, and the “electoral path”, which opted for a 
liberal and democratic constitution.12 The difficulty of forcing a consensus around these 
contradictory values was quite clear. The first version of the Portuguese Constitution, approved in 
1976, had a heavy ideological weight of Marxist-Leninist content through an overly programmatic 
wording.13 This impressive ideological twist could have commuted into left-wing authoritarianism.  
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To begin with, the Portuguese Preamble states that “the Constituent Assembly affirms the 
Portuguese people’s decision to ‘open up a path towards a socialist society’”.14 This kind of poetic and 
idealized Preamble is typical of what Liav Orgad calls a “ceremonial-symbolic Preamble”.15 According 
to the author, the Portuguese Preamble, due to its ineluctable politic character, should not be legally 
enforceable and is just a nonbinding historical and symbolic statement. 
Next, the first Article of the Portuguese Constitution (first version of 1976) stated that “Portugal is a 
sovereign republic committed to transformation into a society without classes”. The constitutional 
text had norms such as: “the Portuguese Republic is a democratic State with the goal of assuring the 
transition to socialism through the creation of conditions for the exercise of power by the working 
classes” (Article 2); “the law can regulate that the expropriation of landowners, owners and 
entrepreneurs or shareholders do not give rise to any compensation” (Article 82); “all 
nationalizations are irreversible conquests of the working classes” (Article 83). 
There is no requirement of presenting more examples. This small sample of articles is enough to 
understand why some doctrines warned of a dangerous mismatch between text and constitutional 
reality, which would culminate in the loss of the normative force of the Portuguese Constitution.16 
This a perfect example of what Richard Albert describes as “constitutional dismemberment”, which is 
a “deliberate effort to transform the identity, the fundamental values or the architecture of the constitution 
without breaking legal continuity”.17 Fortunately, the constitutional amendments of 1982 and 1989 
reshaped the Portuguese Constitution and made it consonant with the substantive requirements of a 
truly democratic Rule of Law.  
Aspirational constitutionalism can become a sort of a “cult of constitutionalism”18, or, as a 
Portuguese author had once described, a “constitutional psychosis” that asks from the constitution 
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way more than what it can ever give. In this scenery, in each political turn all the attention will 
“anxiously turn to the magical idea of the constitution, as if the solution to every problem depended 
exclusively on it”.19 If a constitutional text is an exercise of erudition, intellect and poetry, then its 
rules and principles will probably not have immediate applicability and will be “sleeping rules.”20 
 SOCIAL RIGHTS PROLIXITY 
C. Social rights design 
A macro-comparative approach shows us that constitutions come in various lengths. For a long 
time, social rights were disregarded as a less important fundamental rights category. In the last 
decades, we can identify a growing trend toward their consecration in constitutional texts.  
A global survey of social rights’ positivation shows a growing number of states with constitutional 
positivation – for example, Portugal, Brazil, Italy, France, Greece, South Africa, Argentina, and 
Chile, just to name a few. Other states, such as Germany, Canada, Australia or the United States, 
prefer to leave social rights to the infra constitutional legislation.21 Nevertheless, while in some 
countries social rights are not a part of constitutional adjudication, this does not translate to social 
rights being constitutionally irrelevant.  
After years of ongoing debates, the main question is still univocally unanswered: do social rights 
belong to the constitutional text? Some answer it affirmatively and base their response in several 
arguments such as social rights are “trumps” against the majority; social rights share the same dignity 
of liberty rights, given the fact that liberty rights are often incomplete without social rights; social 
rights promote a genuine equality (and not just a formal equality) between citizens.22 
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On the other side of this debate, it is argued that the social rights belong to the democratic 
discussion; they are neither fundamental rights nor constitutionally binding; they are incredibly costly 
and an “affordable luxury” only accessible to very rich states.23 Consequently, social rights could 
never be designed as rights, but are instead moral duties that arise from a social idea. 
D. Unbreakable walls require demolition techniques 
The language of indivisibility – liberty rights versus social rights – is not uncommon and, according to 
Jeff Kenner, “[it] cloaks the reality of a 50-year long schism”.24 This systematic option is the reality of 
most international legislations approved after the Second World War. In 1966, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”) were approved. Yet, there are remarkable peculiarities 
regarding the ICESCR when compared with the ICCPR. Firstly, the ICCPR addresses states whereas 
the ICESCR addresses individuals. Secondly, there is a progressive clause in the ICESCR that does 
not exist in the ICCPR. Thirdly, contrary to the ICCPR, the ICESCR recognizes that the rights’ 
implementation depends on available resources. 
In an international regional dimension, there is also a clear division between the European 
Convention on Human Rights, 1950 (“ECHR”) and the European Social Charter, 1961 (“ESC”). 
The latter has a very inferior enforceability level when compared to the ECHR. If the ECHR is 
enforced by the European Court of Human Rights, ESC is monitored by the European Committee 
of Social Rights, which, until recently, was not considered as a jurisdictional organ.25 In confirmation 
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of this idea, an analysis of the constitutional jurisprudence – in states members of the Council of 
Europe – reveals beyond doubt that the ECHR is widely cited and used as a ground for 
jurisdictional decisions, while references to ESC are infinitesimal.26 Furthermore, rights protected by 
the ECHR are susceptible to an individual complaint under article 34, a situation that is not echoed 
by the mechanisms provided for the protection of the rights provided by the ESC.27 
After the Second World War, the profound ideological division between liberal and socialist 
worldviews translated itself to the normative context. However, this division should not be 
exacerbated. In author’s opinion and in a dogmatic perspective, we should not divide fundamental 
rights according to different values, as if liberty rights were first class rights and social rights were 
second class rights.28 These days, we can see a global effort to change the perspective of a 
constitutional or international “apartheid” between liberty and social rights.29 There is not a “clear-
cut division” between these rights, which is why eventual differences should not be related to alleged 
diverse levels of dignity/relevance/ontological worthiness, but should be associated with different 
formal traits of the norms that consecrate fundamental rights instead.30 
During several decades, a common perspective regarding fundamental rights divided them into two 
sealed and impenetrable categories: (i) liberty rights, which are negative rights, rest on state abstention 
and, therefore, are cost-free; and (ii) social rights, which are sheer positive rights and demand costly 
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and extensive intervention from the state in order to correct inequalities. In other words, the main 
logic we are used to, even if just for propaedeutic intentions, is the following: (a) liberty rights → non 
facere obligations → non costly; (b) social rights → facere obligations → costly.  
In the last decade, there have been many doctrinal and jurisprudential enlightenments which show 
us that this dichotomy can be misleading. On the one hand, both liberty and social rights have 
negative and positive dimensions. Although their positive dimension represents a considerable 
length in social rights design, it is certainly not an exclusive liberty rights’ trait.31 Social rights do have 
negative dimensions, even if in some rights’ design this negative dimension is just distinguishable in 
the rights’ minimum content. Liberty rights also have positive dimensions, as electoral rights can 
easily demonstrate.  
Regarding rights’ costs, there is a tendency to consider social rights as overly pricey when compared 
to cost-free liberty rights.32 The truth is that all fundamental rights have significant budgetary 
implications and the idea of cost-free rights is a myth.33 
In conclusion, liberty and social rights cannot be successfully compartmentalized because they are 
deeply interconnected and mutually dependent. They always require the reciprocal enlightenment of 
engagement.   
E. Social rights in the Portuguese Constitution  
C.1  Identifying social rights’ regimes 
The wishful thinking of the Portuguese constitutional framers is well documented. Many foreign 
authors considered this baroque text an inconsistent compromise between liberalism and socialism.34 
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The illusion of continuous progress translated in one of the widest social rights’ catalogue in the 
world and probably the widest in Europe.35 
In the Portuguese Constitution fundamental rights are divided in two categories: (i) rights, liberties 
and freedoms (Title II – articles 24 to 57); (ii) social, economic and cultural rights (Title II – articles 
58 to 79). To highlight this distinction, the Constitution warrants liberty rights (b) article 9) and 
promotes social rights (d) article 9). As we can see, these verbs are not synonyms and reflect a 
particular constitutional idiosyncrasy.  
This division is relevant since the constitutional framer consecrated a special regime for rights, 
liberties and freedoms (herein liberty rights). Indeed, the Portuguese Constitution reserves a special 
regime to liberty rights: they have immediate applicability, bind public and private entities and 
benefit from rigorous limitations to their restriction (article 18);36 the right to “resist any order that 
infringes their rights, freedoms or guarantees and, when it is not possible to resort to the public 
authorities, to use force to repel any aggression” (article 21); furthermore, unless it also authorizes 
the Government to do so, the Assembly of the Republic (Parliament) has exclusive competence to 
legislate on liberty rights (b) no. 1 article 165);37 finally, amongst several material limitations on 
constitutional amendment, “constitutional revision laws must respect citizens’ rights, freedoms and 
guarantees” (d) article 288).  
C.2 Social rights’ specificities in the Portuguese Constitution 
Given social rights’ specificities in the Portuguese legal system, it is necessary to establish whether 
the relationship between liberty rights and social rights should be dichotomous, unitary or of interaction. 
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We stand for a renewed understanding of social rights, based on logic of material indivisibility and 
structural interaction between liberty rights and social rights.38 
Given the impressive array of social rights, the question that follows can be stated thus: which is the 
social rights’ regime? Is it same as liberty rights? The Portuguese doctrine is highly divided on this 
matter. We will present the three main narratives that were built around this inquiry:  
A. Some authors defend a rigid bifurcation between liberty and social rights and even argue 
for an ontological superiority of liberty rights when compared with social rights.39 Far from 
conferring independent constitutional rights, social rights would be principles orientating 
state’s action.  
B. At the other extreme of this discussion, others defend regime parity between both the rights 
and refuse any distinction.40 Even if social rights’ content are not constitutionally 
determined, the reality is that the Portuguese legislator has already legislated on all social 
rights. Then, this infra constitutional legislation on social rights has reached the status of 
fundamental worth as a constitutional continuum.41 Yet the assumption underpinning this 
thesis – that fundamental rights’ regime is unitary – is not what the constitutional text 
consecrates de jure condito, albeit interesting de jure condendo.  
C. Nevertheless, the majority of the doctrines (as included by the author) supports an 
intermediate thesis – more or less equidistant – which states that there is no substantial 
hierarchy between rights, just a formal distinction, based either on different regimes, on 
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State’s duties or even on the determinability of the right’s content.42 According to this 
perspective and in a dogmatic point of view, fundamental rights (either liberty rights or 
social rights) are indivisible, unitary and non-hierarchical. However, the constitutional 
design of fundamental rights has significant differences, whether the norm is a liberty right 
or a social one. 
There is dissimilarity between immediate applicability and binding effect. A norm can have a binding 
effect without being immediately applicable.43 In the Portuguese context, immediate applicability 
means that the courts can apply the Constitution directly, even against an infra-constitutional law. In 
other words, immediate applicability is the possibility of direct application, regardless of 
interpositiolegislatoris.44 That being said, we can conclude that immediate applicability is a plus, an 
upgrade of the principle of constitutionality. All fundamental rights are binding, but not all of them 
are normanormata and benefit from having immediate applicability.  
Therefore, the author proposes a distinction of immediate applicability intensity. Up to a certain 
point, all fundamental rights are immediately applicable – they benefit from what we call a “latosensu 
immediate applicability”, which means that they can derogate norms that violate them or serve as an 
interpretative tool. Prima facie, social rights norms are only latosensu immediately applicable. If they 
prove to be clear, precise and unconditional, then they will be upgraded to benefit from the liberty 
rights regime, which has strictosensu applicability45.  
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C.3 Requiem for the non-retrocession principle? 
The spirit of generosity of the Portuguese constitutional frames regarding social rights’ design raises 
many pertinent questions and exacerbates some problems. One interesting debate is with regard to 
the question, whether social rights granted in infra-constitutional legislation can be restricted or even 
limited. Is there a principle of irreversibility of social conquests? 
The principle of the prohibition of social retrogression is not stated in the Portuguese Constitution, 
but some argue that it springs from rule of law derivations, such as the principles of equality, 
proportionality and trust protection (doctrine of legitimate expectations).46 Consequently, once a 
social right receives concretization in infra-constitutional legislation, it becomes a substantive 
constitutional fundamental right – acquired or vested social right – and cannot be eliminated or 
restricted.47 
The author strongly disagrees with this thesis. Firstly, the democratic principle rests upon the 
principles of majority rule, periodicity, pluralism and the fact that elected legislatures are the 
principal forum for passing laws in a representative democracy.48 Insomuch as legislative process is 
not a one-way street, the legislator is free to change the relevance he gives to each fundamental right, 
considering that he respects other fundamental principles and constitutional limitations to 
restrictions.  
Secondly, this theoretical construction is wrongly premised on fundamental social rights being self-
executing norms on the grounds of their constitutional consecration. If we accept the assertion that 
the legislator cannot go back in any social right’s policy, then the lofty goals of our glorious social 
rights’ catalogue would translate in a potential constitutionalization of the entire infra-constitutional 
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legislations on social rights.49 It seems that the seductiveness of pan-constitutionalism – 
transformation of infra constitutional law in constitutional law – is still alive.50 
Thirdly and quite ironically, social rights would be more immune to the legislative activity than 
liberty rights, on account of liberty rights’ restriction being admissible in the Portuguese 
Constitution.51/52 
According to the author, the non-retrocession principle is not a constitutional principle but motto 
for political programmes. Nonetheless, we must stress out some constitutional safeguards that the 
Portuguese constitution allows on social rights: (i) retrocession must always be sufficiently grounded 
for protecting another in casu stronger constitutional right;53 (ii) social rights’ core must be protected. 
For example, the Portuguese legislator cannot eliminate the national health system, but he can 
change it into a more or less socialized system or a more or less decentralized one.54 
What we object is that there is no justification for claiming social rights as immutable. Successive 
cycles of fiscal loosening and retrenchment are a reality of economic recoveries and setbacks. 
Despite many social empathic yet circular defenses of the non-retrogression principle, we are not 
convinced of their validity. Additionally, the non-retrogression principle receives scant attention 
from the Portuguese jurisprudence.  
In 1984, the instantly created Portuguese Constitutional Court applied the principle of non-
retrogression, in a famous judgment concerning a legislation that revoked a significant part of the 
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law that created a national health system.55 From this judgment onwards, the Constitutional Court 
adopted terse, decaffeinated and rhetorical references to non-retrogression, essentially referring to 
the judgment of 1984, but deciding on the grounds of violation of other (constitutional) principles. 
Its lingering presence in the Portuguese jurisprudence through several decades indicates poor 
dogmatic grounding for non-retrogression as a constitutional principle.56 
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
A. Constitutional courts trapped in a legitimacy crisis 
Almost 40 years ago, Ernst Forsthoff prognosticated a “transition from a parliamentary legislative 
state to a judicial-constitutional judicial state”.57 Once surpassed the idea of judicial activity as mere 
legal syllogistic reasoning or “buche qui prononce les paroles de la loi”, it was recognized that this activity 
included moments of creation and influenced the political process of a dynamic society.58 The 
danger of the judicial usurpation of politics is very well-know.59 Michel Rosenfeld argues 
constitutional states tend to constitutionalize the political and to politicize the constitution.60 
The economic and financial crises that have affected Europe reopened the debate about judicial self-
restraint as a tool for interpreting more abstract norms, such as fundamental rights norms. When 
legislative power acts contrary to the constitution, jurisdictional power (constitutional courts and/or 
the ordinary courts, depending on the constitutional justice model) can invalidate this 
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unconstitutional action – jurisdictional restraint. Contrastingly, the only control available for 
jurisdictional activity is self-restraint.  
Constitutional courts are not co legislators but controllers. Legislative power does have that positive 
function of creating legislation.61 Constitutional courts are asked to intervene as a “negative 
legislator”, in order to invalidate unconstitutional positive inputs given by the legislative power.62 
Should constitutional judges upgrade from mere “negative legislators” or watchdogs to 
policymakers? 63 
Even so, the constitutional court’s activity is quite difficult. We cannot lose insight of what 
constitutional courts are asked: to decide whether or not public policies respect the Constitution. On 
one hand, if the constitution is political, then a constitutional judgment cannot be politically aseptic. 
On the other hand, courts should not dethrone legislators.64 Therefore, what divides politics from 
constitutional jurisdictions is not the quisjudicabit (object) of their decisions – constitutional text – but 
the grounding for their decisions.65 If legislators are responsible for the lawmaking, constitutional 
courts are adjudicators.  
Nevertheless, there is a qualitative difference about legislation and jurisprudence.66 As the legislator 
is the first constitutional interpreter, its function is to determine prima facie that whether the 
legislation is in accordance with the constitution. Besides, the legislator benefits from a constitutional 
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preference, on the grounds of being the state power responsible for creating legislation. On the other 
hand, constitutional primacy is given to constitutional courts for interpreting and applying the 
constitutional text.67 
Nowadays, judicial activism is a label often used to inadvertently shadow constitutional 
enlightenment. Very sharply, Nuno Garoupa discusses whether the pejorative term “activism” really 
is “a bad thing”.68 In a context like the Portuguese one, where the Constitutional Court has 
significant powers of constitutional review, judicial activism cannot simply mean strong 
constitutional adjudication.69 Therefore, given the fact that the label “judicial activist” is used quite 
superficially, we agree with the author’s conclusion of “judicial activism” being somehow “an empty 
concept”, hence a vicious circular concept.70 
According to the author, a properly understood notion of “judicial activism” would then be one that 
describes controversial judicial behavior, “judicial misuse of authority”, such as “sticking down 
constitutional legislation” or acting from a partisan point of view.71 As Mattias Kumm points out 
“once judicial power becomes so strong that overall legislative effective control is lost, the step from 
contestatory democracy to juristocracy has been taken”. 72 
B. Do aspirational constitutions promote judicial activism?  
B.1 Portuguese Constitutional Court and austerity  
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A prolix positivation of social rights could lead to an uncontrolled judicial activism, especially in a 
crisis context and when all eyes are on the state’s budget.73 When critiques regarding the activity of 
the constitutional court are polarized, then also their legitimacy is being questioned. In the European 
context, constitutional courts were widely criticized for acting with substantial judicial self-restraint 
when faced with decisions that carried out severe economic implications.74 This attitude was seen as 
an unacceptable deference to the legislator and an inversion of the constitutionality principle.75 
Likewise, the Portuguese Constitutional Court (PCC) was often criticized by its favor legislatoris 
(deference towards the legislator) jurisprudence in the beginning of the application of the 
Memorandum of Understanding.76 This problem was very pertinent during “Troika” intervention in 
Portugal, which started in 2011.77 The Memorandum of Understanding signed between the 
International Monetary Fund, the European Commission and the European Central Bank compelled 
the Portuguese legislators to a very strict austerity programme, which predictably lead to significant 
budgetary cuts and other measures: public sector wage cuts, tax increases, flexibilization of dismissal 
rules, pensions cuts and other welfare benefits, privatization of public utilities, increased working 
hours (for civil servants and equivalent), convergence of pension systems (public and private 
sectors), amongst other measures.  
During 2010-2011, PCC judgments seemed to adhere to the crisis’s rhetoric and to refrain from 
interfering with budgetary impositions and international commitments.78/79 These endogenous and 
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exogenous constraints justified the permissiveness of the PCC, which allowed many austerity laws to 
remain in force or to get into force.  
However, soon after, the PCC showed a decreasing deference towards the legislator, arguing that the 
“exceptional argument” could not be sustained for a long period of time and stating that its 
tolerance to the crisis argument would be inversely proportional to the duration of the crisis.80 
More recently, the PCC undertook a formulation of the constitutionality judgment according to the 
reasoning of normality, giving as surpassed the argument of exceptional economic-financial 
conjuncture.81 These reasoning coincided with the Portuguese withdrawal from the assistance 
program by June 2014.  
These cases thus emphasize the power given to constitutional jurisdictions. Even if the PCC did not 
invalidate unconstitutional governmental measures on the grounds of fundamental social rights 
violations – but the violation of the principles of equality, proportionality, and protection of trust 
instead – its activity was considered highly activist.82 The PCC received unprecedented attention and 
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international coverage, which combined endorsement and disapproval insights.83 How did the PCC’s 
reputation change from almost 30 years of a relatively unknown existence (not to say a diminished 
existence) to a kind of super-hero constitutional guardian (to some) or to a constitutional juristocracy (to 
others)? 
If some praised the Court’s unwillingness to convey with social state downsizing,84 others consign it 
to a corner of shame for supporting an unaffordable welfare state and obstructing a free-market 
economy.85 In an empirical point of view, a Portuguese study revealed that the judicial behavior of 
the PCC “exhibits much less exceptional patterns than often argued”.86 
Regardless of where one stands in the above controversy, it is important to stress out that a 
constitutional court is not just “another court”. Although constitutional courts share the main 
aspects of other jurisdictions – so, regarding this subject, the logic should not be one of 
“constitutional courts” versus “the others”87 – at the same time they display very distinctive traits: the 
designation of their judges, the object of their decisions and, more importantly, their parameter – the 
Constitution. A constitutional text is not just the norma normarum of a state (only through an internal 
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perspective, by all means) but a very complex and compromised political tissue.88 There is a world of 
difference between interpreting the constitution text or an infra constitutional norm.89 
B.2 Right-to-health litigation in Brazil: helicopter judging?  
On the other side of the Atlantic, the Brazilian Constitution competes with the Portuguese in terms 
of the magnitude of the catalogue of fundamental rights, in particular the one referring to social 
rights. The 1988 Brazilian Constitution establishes economic, social and cultural rights, spread over 
several articles – 6, 8, 11, 205 and 214. Unlike the Portuguese Constitution, in this constitutional text 
liberty and social rights are not divided into different categories and the immediate applicability 
clause (article 5 § 1) can be interpreted in a way that applies to all fundamental rights.90 
In this scenario, it is not surprising that an uncontrolled judicial activism has emerged, especially 
with regard to fundamental social rights to health, education, housing, environment and social 
assistance.91 Many scholars even refer to an “epidemic of litigation.”92 
Perhaps, the main critic to judicial activism is the one acknowledging its casuistic approach.93 
Situations of social exclusion and social rights implantation should be primarily addressed through 
legislation. Detractors of judicial activism argue that it impacts the separation of powers principle, 
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namely by involving courts in traditional legislative and executive functions. We have to keep in 
mind that the separation of powers is the bulwark of democratic and balanced societies.  
Unlike normative acts (e.g., constitution, laws), which are general and abstract, non-normative acts 
(e.g., administrative acts, court decisions) are individual and concrete. Judicial acts apply general and 
abstract norms to the circumstances of the concrete legal dispute between adverse parties. 
Hypothetically, given a situation where right X is on stake, litigant A can obtain a positive result, 
whereas litigant B might have his request rejected. It is up to the judiciary to clarify the meaning of 
legislation and to apply it to concrete disputes. In other words, legislators are responsible for macro-
justice, whereas judges have a micro-justice role, as they decide in a one-case-at-a-time perspective.94 
Judicial empowerment is not compatible with judicial definition/concretization of what a 
fundamental right is, but how this right applies itself in a concrete case. For example, health 
litigation in Brazil attracted wide media coverage. New alleged fundamental rights to “therapeutic 
innovation” and to “healthcare tourism” are emerging. These rights gather many corollaries, such as: 
access to unorthodox treatments, experimental therapies and other non-validated medical practices, 
innovative surgery, and access to not yet approved drugs or not even included on governmental 
drug formularies/protocols.  
There will always be a certain amount of dissatisfaction in the fulfilling of the right to health, as it 
combines a myriad of more or less convincing drugs/treatments with limited state resources. That 
being said, we have to analyze if the judiciary ought to protect social rights as a reaction to the 
inaction or insufficient commitment of the legislator. If health is one of the budgetary items 
responsible for draining the majority of public funds, should judges decide to attribute huge 
amounts of the state’s budget to very expensive treatments/drugs, even if they lack convincing data 
on their efficacy? 
When courts act as social rights’ enablers, allowing every single demand, they will inevitably 
compromise state’s budget. Then, their legal reasoning will be (knowingly or unknowingly) 
metamorphosed in political reasoning, jeopardizing the constitutional division of powers.   
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Just as psychologists identifies “helicopter parenting” phenomenon in our parenting generation, we 
recognize in this judicial behavior a pathology that we call helicopter judging. This metaphor allows us 
to understand how judges, facing cases involving health, housing (and other life) struggles, can easily 
be tempted to hover over citizens like a helicopter. This could be perceived as a somehow 
imprudent or at least impulsive behavior. Some scholars even warned about the dangers of judiciary 
“messianic” approaches or jurisdictional “emotionality”, relying on populist and demagogic 
analysis.95 
This syndrome of over judging could also lead to other pathologies described above. If judges 
constantly shadow citizens in a way that is overprotecting, they discourage them to search 
democratic ways to change the laws. Even if they start off with good intentions, judges will 
inadvertently contribute to an “infantilized” society.96 
In medio stat virtus?97 Not always, but generally this seems to be true. To us, the key would be a 
balance between a too libertarian or a too paternalistic approach. On the one hand, judges have a 
role to play, which is why they simply cannot be passive and accept a continuous legislative silence 
on rights that demand legislator intervention. On the other hand, instead of being so enmeshed, 
judges need to take a step back and allow legislative and executive powers to honor their 
constitutional tasks. 
FINAL REMARKS – TRILOGY OR TRINITY? 
From our perspective, there is sometimes a bias inherent to social rights, as if the word “social” was 
a hint for social rights being part of a socialist discourse. There is a rooted fallacy from the last 
decades that scholars ought to unmask. For this reason, it is important to emphasize that the 
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concept of social state should not be held hostage by any political or ideological conception.98 
Constitutional history demonstrates that the label “social state” is imbued in the narratives of several 
political views, whether social Christian, socialist, capitalist, nationalist, utilitarian, conservative or 
progressive liberal.  
Despite of social rights’ language streaming more or less naturally in a given ideology, it is not 
directly linked to any political view. Instead, it flows from its umbilical source: human dignity. 
Irrespective of whether all parties share the same views on reduction/increasing of state size or state 
intervention on macro-economic matters, social protection is a common denominator. In the realm 
of politics, comparisons are often misleading. Thus, social rights should not be a sort of ideological-
cultural inheritance of a predetermined political party, elite (or, more broadly, political ideology), 
since all democratic political parties promote social justice.  
As the author tried to demonstrate, aspirational constitutions may be trapped in their own generosity 
due to their likely utopian characteristics. Just the belief that a state can convey to the fullest extent 
all constitutional rights is faced with the harsh reality of scarce goods, resource limitations and 
fluctuating macro-economic circumstances.99 If on the one side of the coin we have entitlements, on 
the flip side we do not have (due to de facto limitations) unlimited resources and full right’s 
application.  
This previous consideration should not be followed by the unilluminating conclusion that 
constitutionalizing social rights was a poor idea. Although social rights consecration in a constitution 
is not a sufficient predictor of social rights effective implementation,100 we have good reasons to 
believe that upgrading these rights in a constitutional text was a very important step in post-
authoritarian/totalitarian states. If anything, social rights discourse has a rhetoric significance that 
should not be taken for granted – we believe this to be true, without any kind of surreptitious 
condescendence. 
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The focal point remains unanswered: (i) are aspirational constitutionalism, social rights prolixity and 
judicial activism three related subjects – a trilogy? Or (ii) are aspirational constitutionalism, social 
rights prolixity and judicial activism mutually interdependent - a trinity? 
This new seam of constitutional challenges are quite enriching and yet difficult to answer univocally. 
In our point of view, the flimsiest connection is the latter (i.e., social rights prolixity → judicial 
activism). We can say that aspirational constitutions will have social rights’ catalogues and, most 
likely, their catalogues will be generous. However, does aspirational constitutionalism and social 
rights prolixity necessarily mean judicial activism?  
The answer to this question will depend on the adopted definition of “judicial activism”. As I stated 
before, if we label “judicial activism” as engaging in strong forms of judicial review, then we can 
portrait both Brazilian courts and PCC decision-making as activists.101 However, if by “judicial 
activism” we interpret an illegitimate usurpation of legislative or executive powers, there is not an 
umbilical link between them. Usurpation of powers could never be a constitutional trait of a 
democratic state, but only a pathology requiring treatment.  
Consequently, we don’t have a trinity – that rests upon a premise of the three factors being 
ineluctably interrelated – but a trilogy. In a trilogy there is a series of three related subjects that 
usually come together, but they are not necessarily codependent of each other.    
As stated before, public policies involve significant compromise and arduous choices that benefit 
some rights (or rights dimensions) to the detriment of full implementation of other rights. It is true 
that undue conquest of political decisions encourages judicial activism. After all, jurisdictional 
function does not entail rewriting the constitution, but applying it in accordance with the 
constitutional reality.102 
However, this does not justify the disregard of social rights as a normative constitutional concept 
nor that constitutional courts should acquiesce to the political majorities. What it requires is stronger 
vigilance and the break of the misconception that public policies cannot be criticized. Here, the main 
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problem is how to satisfy the double objective of limiting both legislator’s and judge’s activities. If 
the judge’s activity is limited, then the legislator will have a wider margin of legislative design. If the 
legislator has a narrower margin of legislative discretion, then the judge will be able to contribute to 
the (living) constitutional design of his state.   
In sum, two lessons can be drawn. First, conventional self-restraint is not compatible with the 
paramount expression, social rights have in aspirational constitutions. That is why, in our point of 
view, a disregard of constitutional social rights conflicts with the wide consecration, which they have 
in the Portuguese and Brazilian constitutions. We need to realize that the judicial role can be played 
with accuracy, endeavor, creativity and even activism (not pejorative one), without overstepping 
separation of powers. Second, the confine of judicial activism is precisely the constitutional 
separation of powers. For this reason, there should be no judicial activism at the sake of democracy. 
To us, it is quite an illusion or a fallacy to separate, with a perfect dividing line, law from politics. We 
can perform conceptual divisions and undertake complex line-drawing maneuvers, but in the end, 
there will always be some kind of intersection.103 Notwithstanding areas of imbrications and 
significant blurriness, the reign of politics should refrain from overpowering the reign of law. Macro-
economic decision-making pertains to democratic deliberation and popular sovereignty, albeit fertile 
exchanges of ideas amongst state powers are always welcome.  
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